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A frequently litigated issue in contractual disputes is whether a non-breaching party can recover its alleged consequential damages arising under a contract. Consequential damages, or special damages, may include monetary losses stemming from lost profits. If a party can establish a breach under the contract, then a party may be able to recover its consequential damages if these damages were a foreseeable outcome of the breach. In breach of contract actions in Florida, “[o]ne of the “most commonly litigated and thus the most often sought after item of consequential damages is lost profits.” Halliburton Co. v. E. Cement Corp., 672 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation attorney, and represents clients in business litigation in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

In breach of contract claims, there is a distinction between general damages and consequential damages. General damages are “those damages which naturally and necessarily flow or result from the injuries alleged.” Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1972). Stated differently, general damages may be described as those damages “as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising in the usual course of events from the breach of contract itself.” Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Beaver St. Fisheries, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). By contrast, special damages are not likely to occur in the usual course of events, but “may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract.” Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Beaver St. Fisheries, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Special damages consist of items of loss which are peculiar to the party against whom the breach was committed and would not be expected to occur regularly to others in similar circumstances.

Likewise, consequential damages “do not arise within the scope of the immediate buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by the non-breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a proximate result of the breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at the time of contracting.” Hardwick Properties, Inc. v. Newbern, 711 So. 2d 35, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citations omitted). As one example Florida law, Section 672.715 of Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code defines “consequential damages” resulting from a seller’s breach, as:

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Tortious interference claims arise when another business or person unjustly interferes with the business or contractual relationships of another business. However, all interference is not inherently “tortious” under Florida law. For example, certain types of interference may qualify as “privileged” or “justified” when the party acts in its own financial interests and the interference does not involve physical violence, misrepresentations, intimidation, conspiratorial conduct, illegal conduct, or threats of illegal conduct. Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation attorney, and represents clients in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach. The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

A business or person for tortious interference when the opposing party unjustifiably interfered with business or contractual relationships. “The tort of tortious interference teeters between two competing values—the desire to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties to a business relationship on the one hand, and the need to avoid excessive restrictions on freedom of competition on the other.” Jay v. Mobley, 783 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). To succeed on a tortious interference claim, a litigant must prove:

  • the existence of a business relationship under which the plaintiff has legal rights;
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Employees owe their current employers a duty of loyalty under Florida law. This duty of loyalty is a specific fiduciary duty that requires employees to act in the best interest of their current employers.  One example of such a breach is where an employee who starts a competing business while still working for the employer. Another example is where an employee uses its current employer’s confidential information for personal gain outside the scope of employment and without the employers’ knowledge. In these breach of loyalty scenarios, businesses may have viable causes of actions against the breaching employees and may be entitled to lost profits and other damages. Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation attorney, and represents clients in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

“An employee owes a duty to her employer to exercise diligence and good faith in matters relating to the employment.” Brigham v. Brigham, 11 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Specifically, “an employee may not engage in disloyal acts in anticipation of his future competition, such as using confidential information acquired during the course of his employment or soliciting customers and other employees prior to the end of his employment.” Insurance Field Services, Inc. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Service, Inc., 384 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Notably, an employee does not need to be a manager or executive with the employer to have a duty of loyalty. Fish v. Adams, 401 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Indeed, a business has a right to expect that its employees “will not solicit fellow employees on the job to join the employee’s competing business venture.” Terry Roberts Site Work, Inc. v. Unemployment Appeals Com’n, 908 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). However, it is important to note that an employee’s “[a]cts consisting of mere preparation to open a competing business, such as opening a bank account or obtaining office space or telephone service ordinarily do not breach a duty of loyalty” under Florida law. Furmanite Am., Inc. v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

It is a breach of fiduciary duty for a person to misuse confidential information to the detriment of the person who he owes a duty of loyalty. See NHB Advisors, Inc. v. Czyzyk, 95 So. 3d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are: the existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of that duty such that it is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.” Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2002).  In Audiology Distribution, LLC v. Simmons, 2014 WL 7672536 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2014), the plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty was based on allegations that the defendants sold hearing aids and other related services to its patients by misappropriating and wrongfully utilizing confidential patient information. Audiology held the breach of fiduciary duty claim could be based on the employee’s use confidential customer information. Namely, the employee used his employer’s customer information to drive hearing aid sales for his own personal gain while still employed. The employer was entitled to damages as a result.

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A prevalent issue in Florida trade secret litigation is whether an employer adequately protected its trade secrets and confidential information. To qualify for protection under Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“FUTSA”) and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), an employer must show that it adequately maintained the secrecy of its trade secrets and confidential information. One way an employer can demonstrate these protective measures in trade secret litigation is by showing “had rules governing disclosure and confidentiality in its employee handbook.” Se. Mech. Services, Inc. v. Brody, 2008 WL 4613046 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2008). Courts also routinely find that evidence of an employer’s “password restricted” computer systems “are sufficient for the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the Plaintiffs took reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of their trade secrets.” Fortiline, Inc. v. Moody, 2013 WL 12101142 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2013). Florida courts will afford trade secret protection to an employer’s confidential information even if the employer does not require its employees to sign confidentiality agreements. Coihue, LLC v. PayAnyBiz, LLC, 2018 WL 7376908 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2018). Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale trade secret attorney, and also advocates for clients in Palm Beach, Boca Raton, and Miami, Florida.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents corporations and their owners in business litigation, non-compete agreement litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

A confidentiality agreement is merely a method by which a confidential relationship may be established.  There are many other ways that this confidential relationship can be created.  For example, Dotolo v. Schouten held a confidential relationship was formed where a person disclosed confidential information to a potential business partner. 426 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).  Dotolo found:

The [recipients] were instructed that the formula was a trade secret and that the [disclosing party] wished to protect it. The lack of any express agreement on the part of the appellees not to use or disclose [the disclosing party’s] trade secret is not significant. The existence of a confidential relationship such as that in this case gives rise to an implied obligation not to use or disclose.

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A prevalent issue in business litigation is whether a party’s fraud claims are prohibited by an integration clause in a contract. Contracts typically include integration clauses to prevent contracting parties from later asserting claims based on oral statements that were not also expressed in the contract. Integration clauses or “merger” clauses can therefore effectively limit a party’s ability to rely on prior oral representations that were did not ultimately reduce to writing. However ,integration clauses must contain specific language to disclaim a party’s reliance. If an integration clause does not contain an express anti-reliance provision, then contracting parties typically can still bring fraud claims under Florida law. Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation attorney, and represents clients in business litigation in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

Integration clauses will typically prohibit fraudulent inducement claims only if a specific reliance disclaimer exists within the contract. Lower Fees, Inc. v. Bankrate, Inc., 74 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Under Florida law, the mere “existence of an integration clause does not bar a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.” Rodriguez v. Tombrink Enters., Inc., 870 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The rationale supporting this rule is steeped in the foundational purpose of fraud: a party cannot assent to an integration clause under false pretenses. Mejia v. Jurich, 781 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002.  Indeed, the “existence of a merger or integration clause, which purports to make oral agreements not incorporated into the written contract unenforceable, does not affect oral representations that are alleged to have fraudulently induced a person to enter into the agreement.” “[O]ral agreements or representations may be introduced into evidence to prove that a contract was procured by fraud notwithstanding such a merger clause.” Nobles v. Citizens Mortgage Corp., 479 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). General integration clauses lacking specific reliance language therefore are not “an impediment to a cause of action for fraud in the inducement.” Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Absent very specific non-reliance language, integration clauses therefore do not prohibit specific causes of action for fraudulent inducement. Integration clauses cannot immunize a defendant in business litigation from its own fraudulent misrepresentations because standard and often boilerplate provisions would then enable an unbridled propagation of fraud. “If liability for such fraudulent inducements could be negated by the existence of a merger clause—a clause that has become standard in most commercial contracts—then there would be no deterrent to such fraud.” Trafalgar Capital Specialized Inv. Fund, FIS v. Atl. Energy Sols., Inc., 2010 WL 11505575 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2010). For example, in MeterLogic, Inc. v. Copier Sols., Inc., the Southern District Court of Florida refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s fraud claims based on an integration clause because the clause could not provide the defendants with a right to fraudulently induce the plaintiff into the contract. 126 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2000). The court determined the integration clause did not render the contract incontestable because the plaintiff claimed it was fraudulently induced into the contract. MeterLogic further held that: “[i]f a party alleges that a contract was procured by fraud or misrepresentation as to a material fact, an integration clause will not make the contract incontestable.” Indeed, under Florida law, the “presence of a merger/integration clause is not fatal to Plaintiffs’ cause of action for rescission because rescission vitiates every part of the contract.” Tigerdirect, Inc. v. Manhattan Assocs., 2006 WL 8430268 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2006).

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Business litigation often involves contractual disputes and related fraud claims arising between parties. In Florida, contracting parties are generally prohibited from using a contract to limit liability for fraudulent acts. This general prohibition exists because contracting parties are entitled to rely on each other’s representations before entering a contract. However, there is an exception to the rule that allows parties to disclaim fraud liability through a contract if the contract expressly prohibits parties from asserting fraud claims against each other.  The inclusion of this express disclaimer language in contracts can significantly alter remedies available to parties in business litigation after signing a contract. Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation attorney, and represents clients in business litigation in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

Under Florida law, “[i]t is well settled that a party [cannot] contract against liability for his own fraud.” Oceanic Villas Inc. v. Godson, 4 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1941). “A party cannot contract against liability for his own fraud in order to exempt him from liability for an intentional tort, and any such exculpatory clauses are void as against public policy.” Mankap Enterprises, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, a Div. of Baker Protective Services, Inc., 427 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). “The interest protected by fraud is a plaintiff’s right to justifiably rely on the truth of a defendant’s factual representation.” HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996). The singular exception to this rule narrowly applies when a party “expressly states that [the contract] is incontestable on the ground of fraud.” Global Quest, LLC v. Horizon Yachts, Inc., 849 F. 3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2017). A contracting party, therefore, cannot disclaim fraud without a clear expressed intention to do so. “Absent such a disclaimer, no matter the context, ‘a party can not contract against liability for [its] own fraud.’” Oceanic Villas Inc. v. Godson, 4 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1941).

In Oceanic Villas Inc., Florida’s Supreme Court held that contractual provisions disclaiming fraud must be specifically expressed. See Global Quest, LLC v. Horizon Yachts, Inc., 849 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2017). In Oceanic Villas Inc., a lessor fraudulently induced a lessee into a lease by misrepresenting certain facts relating to the rental property’s past income, gross receipts, or profits. 4 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1941). The lessee sued to rescind the lease after discovering the fraudulent misrepresentations and the lessor argued the claim was barred by the lease’s broad release language. Id. However, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the lessor’s argument because the “clause of the contract . . . relied on does not stipulate that the lease may not be rescinded for fraud.” Id. at 691. In so doing, the court distinguished wavier provisions expressly prohibiting rescission due to fraud with other provisions merely stipulating that no fraud was committed and that neither party relied on the other’s prior representations when executing the contract. Id. (contrasting contractual provisions expressly prohibiting fraud claims with other provisions warranting the non-existence of fraud).

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A compilation of a business’ customer information can qualify as a trade secret under Florida and Federal law. This trade secret protection extends further than just a business’ list of customers. A business’ cognizable trade secrets can include a different elements of customer information that are compiled in the aggregate and protected by business. The business must adequately protect this compiled customer information and maintain its confidentiality to protect this information under federal and Florida trade secret laws. Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale trade secret attorney, and also advocates for clients in Palm Beach, Boca Raton, and Miami, Florida.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

Trade secrets are broadly defined under the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“FUTSA”) and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) define trade secrets as information that: (a) is subject to reasonable measures for maintaining the information’s secrecy; and (b) derives independent economic value from not being generally known or readily ascertained through proper means by, another person. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); Fla Stat. § 688.002(4). Under FUTSA and DTSA, trade secrets include information that “derive[s] economic value from not being readily ascertainable by others and must be the subject of reasonable efforts to protect its secrecy.” Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2001). FUTSA also expressly defines trade secrets to include a “list of customers,” so long as the “owner thereof takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 812.081. “Regardless of who compiled the customer list, however, it is clearly protected under [Florida law].” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hagerty, 808 F. Supp. 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

Generally, Florida law considers a business’ customer lists and the information contained therein to be trade secrets subject to protection if that information is compiled from non-public information and is kept confidential by the business. Marine Turbo Eng’g, Ltd. v. Turbocharger Servs. Worldwide, LLC, 2011 WL 6754058 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2011). “Customer lists can constitute trade secrets where the lists are acquired or compiled through the industry of the owner of the lists and are not just a compilation of information commonly available to the public. Kavanaugh v. Stump, 592 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). The unique compilation of customer information typically adds value to a business when it allows the information’s possessor to diminish substantial barriers impeding the exodus of its customers in-mass. “Even if all of the information is publicly available, a unique compilation of that information, which adds value to the information, also may qualify as a trade secret.” Cap. Asset Research Corp. v. Finnegan, 160 F.3d 683 (11th Cir. 1998). “Customer lists are trade secrets if they are compiled from non-public information, and thus derive independent economic value.” Fortiline, Inc. v. Moody, 2013 WL 12101142 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2013).

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The enforceability of arbitration provisions is a prevalent issue in business litigation involving disputes arising from commercial contracts. Arbitration provisions are not always enforceable under Florida law. Under Florida law, the arbitration provision must provide litigants with the same legal remedies that are otherwise available to them in civil litigation. To enforce an arbitration agreement in Florida, a court must find that the party resisting arbitration entered into an arbitration agreement that is enforceable, and that the subject claims fall within the scope of the agreement. Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2008). If certain terms of the arbitration provision violate Florida law, then a litigant may attempt to sever the unlawful terms from the provision, and pursue arbitration pursuant to the contract’s remaining terms. In commercial litigation, arbitration clauses are not severable if the dispute’s sole cause of action seeks to rescind the entire contract. Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation attorney, and represents clients in business litigation in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

An arbitration provision is unenforceable if the contract violates public policy or precludes a party from recovering in arbitration what would be otherwise available in civil court. In Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 86 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2011), the Florida Supreme Court explained that “any arbitration agreement that substantially diminishes or circumvents [statutory] remedies stands in violation of the public policy of the State of Florida and is unenforceable.” Shotts found the arbitration agreement at issue violated public policy.  The Supreme Court based its holding on the fact that the agreement eliminated statutory remedies available to the plaintiff under certain Florida statutes. Nonetheless, a party can still seek to compel arbitration if the agreement contains a severability clause whereby the offending terms can be severed without altering the parties’ intent.

As a general rule, contractual provisions are severable when the unlawful portion of the contract does not go to the contract’s essence, and, where the remaining contract provisions are valid and lawful after the unlawful portion is removed.  Gold, Vann & White, P.A. v. Friedenstab, 831 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). “Severability has long been recognized in Florida’s law of contracts and is determined by the intent of the parties.” Gessa v. Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2011). However, severability is not available when the entire contract or arbitration is unlawful.  Rescission is one remedy available in business litigation between contracting parties who were fraudulently induced to enter a contract. The effect of rescission is to render the contract abrogated and of no force and effect from the beginning. “If there is no contract, there can be no arbitration clause ‘of the contract.’” Borck v. Holewinski, 459 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

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Florida appellate courts regularly scrutinize the methodology used by financial experts in their calculation of lost profits.  Parties are often incentivized to inflate their calculation of lost profits they seek.  Expert witnesses who specialize in damages calculations sometimes testify at trial using damages methodologies that misconstrue the requirements of Florida law.  For example, in State Dep/t of Transp. v. Manoli, 645 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment for lost profits because the damages expert’s opinion “was … based on a misconception of the law and was therefore not admissible.”  In that case, the damages expert failed to deduct wages for the services the owner was performing for the business before reaching his lost profits calculation.  Because lost profits are established by proving income and expenses, the expert’s exclusion of valid expenses from his calculation had the effect of inflating his conclusion of lost profits.  Whether representing a plaintiff or defendant, it is obviously critical to carefully assess the method used to calculate lost profits.  Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation lawyer, and represents clients in business litigation in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

Fundamentally, the concept of lost profits seems simple because it measures the contract price less the expenses involved in performance of the contract.  Florida courts sometimes rely on Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines profits in the following way: “In commerce, it means the advance in the price of good sold beyond the cost of purchase.  In distinction from the wages of labor, it is well understood to imply the net return to the capital of the stock employed, after deducting all the expenses, including not only the wages of those employed by the capitalist, but the wages of the capitalist himself for superintending the employment of his capital or stock.” Florida courts generally require that all costs and expenses needed to perform the contract should be deducted from the balance owing on the contract price.  Indian River Colony Club, Inc. v. Schopke Construction & Engineering, Inc., the appellate court stated in pertinent part: “In arriving at its deductible expenses and costs to determine lost profits, Schopke must deduct the actual supervisory salary paid or, if no salary is paid, the reasonable value of the supervisory services that would have been attributable to performing the contract.  Additionally, Schopke must also deduct any other operating expenses and costs, such as its home office expenses and overhead, which were not reimbursable.”

Florida courts have wrestled with whether fixed costs must be included in the business litigation damages methodology to determine lost profits.  In Boca Developers, Inc. v. Fine Decorators, Inc., 862 So.2d 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal held that fixed costs had to be allocated to the lost profits calculation because there was no evidence indicating that the fixed costs were not involved in performance of the contract.  The appellate court, however, explained that fixed costs are not always part of a valid lost profit calculation.  “This is not to say that a party seeking lost profits is precluded from proving that some endeavors are more profitable than others, because, for example they are less labor intensive.  Fine, however, did not have that type of proof.  In the absence of such, our case law requires that overhead be deducted.”  In Boca Developers, the appellate court explained that the trial judge erred by not ruling that overhead had to be deducted.  The appellate court reversed the trial court and explained that: “It appears from the record, however, that if the judge had correctly ruled that overhead had to be deducted, Fine would have been able to establish the amount of that overhead … Fine should be given the opportunity to do so.  We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues.”

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Under federal law, trademark infringement is proscribed by 15 U.S. C. § 1114(1)(a), which prohibits any person from the “use in commerce [of] any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983), explained that to prevail on a trademark infringement claim based on a federally registered trademark, “the registrant must show that (1) its mark was used in commerce by the defendant without the registrant’s consent and (2) the unauthorized use was likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive.”  Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale business litigation attorney, and represents clients in business litigation in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach.  The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.

The starting point in business litigation over trademark infringement is to demonstrate an unauthorized “use” of the plaintiff’s mark in commerce.  For a mark to be “used in commerce” the mark must be “placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127.  If such an unauthorized “use” is shown by the plaintiff, the first prong of a trademark infringement action has been satisfied. Federal courts have interpreted the term “use” to extend to situations where the alleged use does not fall literally within the wording of the federal trademark statute.  For example, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that where a restaurant gave store customers Coca-Cola when they asked for Pepsi, and indicated on store receipts that its customers were getting “Coke” when they were in fact getting “Pepsi,” that “[t]aken alone, such conduct … appears to present a clear-cut case of trademark infringement.”

In Optimum Technologies, Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit decided a federal trademark infringement lawsuit filed by a manufacturer of a home consumer produce called “Lok-Lift Rug Gripper,”  consisting of a two-sided adhesive product that can be applied in strips to the backs of rugs and mats to secure them in place an prevent slippage on various surfaces.  The manufacturer (Optimum) sued its former distributor (HCA) for trademark infringement following termination of their business relationship.  Optimum claimed that HCA created a competing product called “Hold-It,” and sold that product at various hardware stores, including Home Depot, throughout the southeastern part of the United States.  The business litigation concerned whether the statutory term “use” applied to HCA when the Home Depot stores make the mistake of placing Hold-It products on its shelves with the incorrect name “Lok-Lift Rug Gripper” underneath it.  In addition, Home Depot stores had display cases that were labeled “Lok-Lift” when, to the contrary, the products displayed were the “Hold-It” products.  In addition, Optimum alleged that some consumers who purchased Hold-It products at Home Depot were given printed store receipts that instead referenced “Lok-Lift.”  The federal appellate court determined that there clearly was an unauthorized use in commerce of Optimum’s trademark.  However, the court explained that “the pivotal question for us on appeal is whether these alleged unauthorized ‘uses’ of the mark at the retail level should be attributable to … HCA, as distributor of both the Lok-Lift and Hold-It products.”

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