The plain terms of a contract control the parties’ course of conduct for all matters subject to that contract’s terms. See Maher v. Schumacher, 605 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that the plain meaning of the contractual language used by the parties controls). The Court is prohibited from rewriting contract terms. Pol v. Pol, 705 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“It is well established that a court cannot rewrite the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.”). However, non-complete law contains a powerful exception allowing courts to disregard the well- pronounced prohibition against rewriting contracts. Courts can “blue-pencil” (i.e., Judicially modify) provisions of non-compete agreements when they do not conform to the requirements of Florida’s restrictive covenant statute, Section 542.335, Florida Statutes. In doing so, blue pencil laws breathe life into an otherwise invalid contractual provision. The blue pencil exception can be an important tool for those attempting to obtain relief under a contractual provision that violates the restrictive covenant statute. The Mavrick Law Firm represents businesses and their owners in breach of contract litigation and related claims of fraud, non-compete agreement litigation, trade secret litigation, trademark infringement litigation, employment law, and other legal disputes in federal and state courts and in arbitration.
A court’s ability to “blue-pencil” a restrictive covenant is limited to modifying the scope of the provision to bring it within the ambit of non-compete law. See White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of Se. Florida, LLC, 226 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2017) (Courts are commanded to “modify, or blue pencil, a non-competition agreement that is overbroad, overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest.”). The court can only narrow a restrictive covenant to the extent needed to protect the plaintiff’s established legitimate business interests. Id. (noting that courts can modify overbroad restrictive covenants to “grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest”). Courts can shorten a restrictive covenant that is too long in duration, may curtail the geographical scope to a more limited area, or may constrain the subject matter to particular legitimate business interests. Id.
Blue penciling laws can create perverse incentives for employers and similarly situated parties to draft overbroad provisions they know have little chance of being enforceable. Employers may force their employees to agree to overbroad restrictive covenants to intimidate employees and make them believe they cannot compete in any respect. Employers may believe there is little risk in drafting an overbroad restrictive provision because a court will probably blue-pencil the provision if enforcement is necessary. Therefore, employers could face little risk in purposefully drafting an onerous overbroad restrictive covenant.